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A major goal of the homeland security enterprise is to prevent terrorism in the 
United States. Federal, state, and local agencies have responded to this challenge with a 
number of initiatives that have prevented another large-scale network attack since 9/11. 
Yet terrorism perpetrated by a lone individual, not in direct communication with a larger 
terrorist network, continues to occur on a regular basis in the United States. Rather than 
considering lone-actor terrorism a subset of networked terrorism, this thesis considers 
lone-actor terrorism as a subset of other grievance-fueled violence such as mass murders 
and workplace violence. Comparing the motivations of the perpetrators using a case 
study method, this thesis considers the complexities of addressing the key trait of 
motivation that separates lone-actor terrorism from other forms of lone violence. As a 
result of this analysis, five key observations—leading to five policy implications—are 
postulated to provide clarity to the issue of lone-actor terrorism in pursuance of 
improving prevention methods. 
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Preventing domestic terrorism continues to be a major goal for homeland security 
practitioners. Yet many of our traditional counterterrorism techniques have proven 
inadequate to prevent one particular manifestation of terrorism: the lone actor. No 
network exists to infiltrate the lone-actor threat—there are no communications to 
intercept, no information to task informants, no weapons to trace, and no potential target 
to protect. Addressing the concern of lone-actor terrorism, as called for by lawmakers and 
the American public, requires more deeply understanding the complexity of this 
particular manifestation of violence. 
Even with an increased emphasis on understanding lone terrorism, confusion still 
exists about the nature of such attacks in the United States. Many analysts and 
policymakers view lone-actor terrorism through the lens of networked terrorism. The lone 
actors who have committed some of the most successful and spectacular recent terrorist 
attacks in the United States, however, appear to have more similarities with mass 
murderers than terrorists who are steeped with radical ideology and ready to act for a 
group cause. This has prompted some researchers to postulate two types of lone-actor 
terrorists exist: “real” lone-actor terrorists and mass murderers.1   
The separation between a mass murderer and a lone-actor terrorist lies largely in 
the attacker’s motivation. Mass murderers are driven by a personal grievance or revenge 
while a lone terrorist adheres to a radical ideology to justify violent action. Further 
examination, however, reveals the distinction is not so binary. Many recent lone terrorists 
in the United States may use ideology to justify attacks rather than attacks to promote 
ideology, and some solo mass murderers have claimed collective grievances as part of 
their motivation for violence. The subjective distinctions between the two categories 
continue to blur and shift as we, as a nation, attempt to address the issues associated with 
lone-actor terrorism. Understanding the impact of motivation in a lone attack is a 
worthwhile pursuit to better optimize prevention and detection methods.  
                                                 
1 Randy Borum, Robert Fein, and Bryan Vossekuil, “A Dimensional Approach to Analyzing Lone 
Offender Terrorism,” Aggression and Violent Behavior 17, no. 5 (2012): 392. 
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This thesis was undertaken with the seemingly simple goal of providing clarity to 
the issue of lone-actor terrorism by considering the role of motivation. Using illustrative 
case studies, the thesis examined two lone-actor events that represent the extremes on the 
spectrum of motivation. In the first case, Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, responsible 
for a shooting spree that left one person dead in Arkansas, is considered a largely 
ideologically motivated terrorist. The second case considered Jared Lee Loughner, who 
was responsible for shooting Representative Gabrielle Giffords in Arizona, as an example 
of a predominantly personally motivated attack. The two cases were compared along a 
crime prevention framework that considered how motivation impacts an act of 
premeditated violence. Comparisons to existing studies also helped further explore the 
relationship between lone-actor violence and other forms of grievance-fueled violence 
such as mass murder.   
A qualitative analysis demonstrated the difficulty of determining motivation. The 
mix of personal and ideological grievances can be found in almost all cases of lone-actor 
terrorism, which makes determining motivation extremely subjective. Understanding the 
motivation of an attacker, however, is important. The two cases illustrate individuals 
driven by mostly personal grievances tend to experience a different process of violent 
radicalization, and conduct some aspects of the attack differently than those motivated by 
ideological grievances. As this thesis considered how we can prevent lone-actor 
terrorism, understanding these nuances became critical.   
Ultimately, the confluence of personal and ideological grievances will continue to 
challenge policymakers’ and counterterrorism experts’ efforts to prevent lone-actor 
terrorism. Mental health issues, for example, are much more prevalent in lone-actor 
terrorists than networked terrorists; rates are similar to those of mass murderers. The role 
of mental illness in lone violence, however, is not fully understood. More research is 
needed to better determine this relationship and how mental health treatment might 
reduce lone-actor terrorism.   
Likewise, policymakers should consider current efforts to prevent other forms of 
grievance-fueled violence such as workplace and campus attacks. In these venues, threat 
assessment and management teams are leveraged to produce subject-based strategies to 
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reduce violence from high-risk individuals. Such strategies consider threat assessment 
and threat management as part of the same prevention process. Counterterrorism 
practitioners have, on a reoccurring basis, detected individuals who later commit violent 
crimes. This implies more robust threat management is needed in our efforts to prevent 
lone-actor terrorism.  
We do a disservice to counterterrorism and law enforcement practitioners by 
confusing mass murder and lone-actor terrorism. More importantly, we give terrorist 
groups more credit and more power when we mislabel a mass murder event. Minimizing 
the effects of terrorism might include more restrictive, and uniformly applied, standards 
for what constitutes terrorism. Care must be taken to ensure objectivity when 
categorizing all acts of violence. Perhaps an even more difficult strategy is to consider 
fear reduction as a goal; this strategy reduces terrorist groups’ power over others. Efforts 
to put the terrorist attacks in perspective—to show the American people how rare 
terrorism in the United States really is—may reduce fear and lead to increased resiliency 
among the population.   
Ultimately, the distinctions between lone-actor terrorism and other forms of 
grievance-fueled violence will continue to blur. The nature of the threat is changing and 
will continue to adapt to our law enforcement efforts and take advantage of novel ways to 
influence and communicate. Only by understanding the distinctions, and commonalities, 
between the various subsets of grievance-fueled violence can we hope to develop 
effective preventative measures to reduce lone-actor terrorism. 
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The risk that we’re especially concerned over right now is the lone wolf 
terrorist, somebody with a single weapon being able to carry out wide-
scale massacres. . . .  You know, when you’ve got one person who is 
deranged or driven by a hateful ideology, they can do a lot of damage, and 
it’s a lot harder to trace those lone wolf operators. 
—Barack Obama1 
 
Arguably, the primary mission of the homeland security enterprise is to safeguard 
the United States from terrorism. Counterterrorism practitioners should be commended 
for preventing another large scale terrorist attack in the decades following 9/11. Since 
then, however, numerous smaller-scale attacks, perpetrated by one or two individuals 
operating without the direction or guidance of a larger terrorist network, have tragically 
injured and killed men, women, and children in the United States. After many of these 
attacks occur, we tend to think, as former-President Obama stated in this chapter’s 
opening quotation, that the perpetrator “is deranged or driven by a hateful ideology.” 
Professor John Horgan, a leading researcher in lone-actor violence, and his colleagues 
from Georgia State University point out such master-narratives overlook the complicated 
mix of psychological, personal, and collective grievances that distinguish the lone-actor 
terrorist from other perpetrators of violence.2 Distinct lines separating lone-actor 
terrorists from mass murderers, school shooters, assassins, or workplace shooters are 
often absent. Oversimplifying the issue into seemingly discrete categories hampers 
effective examination and policy recommendations. This thesis aims to provide an 
alternative way to examine the complicated issue of lone-actor terrorism by considering 
the phenomena within the broader context of lone-actor grievance-fueled violence.   
                                                 
1 Barack Obama, interview by Wolf Blitzer, Situation Room, CNN, August 16, 2011, 
http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/08/16/obama-biggest-terror-fear-is-the-lone-wolf/. 
2 Horgan et al. explain these “mono-causal master narrative explanations” are largely due to our 
comfort to search for simple answers after a horrific event. John G. Horgan et al., “Across the Universe? A 
Comparative Analysis of Violent Behavior and Radicalization across Three Offender Types with 
Implications for Criminal Justice Training and Education,” U.S. Department of Justice, June 2016, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249937.pdf.  
 2 
Fatalities from terrorist attacks in Western countries accounted for a small 2.6 
percent of total terrorism deaths between 2000 and 2014.3 The attacks that did occur in 
Western countries, however, were some of the most spectacular and deadly attacks 
worldwide, to include 9/11, the Madrid train bombings, the Norwegian massacre, and the 
London bombings.4 Although counterterrorism experts have successfully prevented 
another 9/11-scale attack on U.S. soil, the American public continues to view smaller-
scale, less impactful lone-actor terrorism as a success of terrorist groups. The scale and 
size of the successful spectacular attacks against the West have left hyper-sensitive 
citizens expecting governments to provide protection against all forms of terrorism, 
regardless of how infrequent or impactful they may be.5   
Key differences exist between lone-actor terrorism and networked terrorism that 
make it especially difficult to prevent solo attacks. Since 9/11, the vast majority of 
successful terrorist events carried out in the United States have been lone attacks. 
Between 2006 and 2014, the United States had the most lone-actor terrorist attacks of any 
Western country, with forty-two attacks and fifty-two deaths.6 By decade, the number of 
lone-actor attacks and fatalities appear to be increasing; the 2010s already surpass every 
other decade, during thirty-five lone-terrorist attacks have killed 115 people.7 This 
number includes the most lethal terrorist attack in the United States since 9/11, the June 
2016 Orlando, Florida attack that left forty-nine people dead.8   
                                                 
3 Of the total number of terrorism deaths in Western countries from 2000 to 2014, 82 percent came 
from the 9/11 attacks. Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), Global Terrorism Index 2015: Measuring 
and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism (IEP Report 36) (New York: IEP, 2015), 
http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf.  
4 Ibid. 
5 Brian Michael Jenkins, Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the 
United States since September 11, 2001 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), 8–9. 
6 IEP, Global Terrorism Index 2015, 54. 
7 Katie Worth, “Lone Wolf Attacks Are Becoming More Common—And More Deadly,” Frontline, 
July 14, 2016, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/lone-wolf-attacks-are-becoming-more-common-
and-more-deadly/. 
8 William Wan and Anne Hull, “Orlando Gunman Had Been Seen on Gay Dating Apps, at Pulse 




How concerned should we really be about lone-actor terrorism? The chance of 
being the victim of a terrorist attack in the United States is negligible, yet few issues 
seem to capture the attention of the American public more than terrorism. According to a 
survey released by the Pew Research Center in August 2016, a majority of Americans are 
more concerned about what politicians would do to keep the United States safe from 
terrorism than any other national issue.9 National media coverage and the horrific and 
unpredictable nature of these events continue to drive public demand for action against 
these low-likelihood violent acts. Yet the limited amount of empirical data on domestic 
terrorism spread over a long period of time make understanding this evolving 
phenomenon a challenge to policymakers and counterterrorism practitioners alike. 
A. SCOPING LONE-ACTOR TERRORISM: A GROWING THREAT 
Central to the issue of lone-actor terrorism is the significance of the problem. In 
testimony to Congress in 2010, Leon Panetta, serving as the director for the Central 
Intelligence Agency, stated, “It’s the lone-wolf strategy that I think we have to pay 
attention to as the main threat to this country.”10 Compared to networked terrorism, 
Panetta correctly assessed the increasing concern. As Figure 1 illustrates, the number of 
lone-actor terrorist is trending higher over each successive decade. Many researchers 
agree that, while lone-actor terrorism is not new, it is becoming more common. Debate 
remains, however, on what should be considered lone-actor terrorism and how significant 
the trend really is. 
                                                 
9 Baxter Oliphant, “In Debates, Voters Want to Hear More about Terrorism and the Economy,” Pew 
Research Center, August 15, 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/08/15/in-debates-voters-
want-to-hear-most-about-terrorism-and-the-economy/. 




 Only successful terrorist attacks were included in the dataset. 
Figure 1.  Lone Terrorism by Decade11 
One challenge of scoping lone-actor terrorism is selecting an unbiased dataset. 
Datasets that include prosecuted cases, for example, may be heavily influenced by the 
increased use of confidential informants to ensure the legal requirements for terrorism 
charges are met. Upwards of fifty percent of terrorism prosecutions since 2009 involve 
informants.12 While the exact use of confidential informants varies from passive 
collection to active participation, the numbers in Figure 1 do not include fifteen “sting” 
operations, which are generally considered unreliable for data collection. Regardless of 
the expanding role of confidential informants, there has been a notable increase in the use 
of terrorism charges as a prosecutorial tool since 2010. For example, the “material 
support to terrorism” charge increased from 11.6 percent of terrorism and national 
security cases in 2007 to 69.4 percent in 2010, and was recorded in 87.5 percent of the 
cases in 2011.13   
                                                 
11 Source: Worth, “Lone Wolf Attacks.” 
12 Beau Barnes, “Confronting the One-Man Wolf Pack: Adapting Law Enforcement and Prosecution 
Responses to the Threat of Lone Wolf Terrorism,” Boston University School of Law Review 92, no. 5 
(2012): 1637. 
13 Ibid., 1645. 
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While some ambiguity exists concerning the number of lone-actor terrorism cases 
in the United States, another common claim is the increasing number of fatalities caused 
by lone terrorists, as illustrated in Figure 2. Lone terrorism appears to have become 
increasingly deadly starting in 2010. Recent attacks—such as the 2015 San Bernardino 
shooting, in which fourteen people were killed, and the Orlando nightclub shooting, in 
which forty-nine individuals were killed, making it the deadliest terrorist attack since 
9/11—provide antidotal evidence supporting the claim that lethality of attacks may be on 
the rise.14 One explanation for this increase may be that lack of active communication 
and training minimized the damage of lone terrorism in past years, but the spread of 
online training and the mimicry of deadly attacks have overcome some of the limitations 
of operating alone.15 Without a widely accepted definition of lone-actor terrorism, 
however, even quantifiable data (such as provided in Figure 2) may be unreliable.16 
 
Figure 2.  Lone Terrorism Fatalities by Decade17 
                                                 
14 Wan and Hull, “Orlando Gunman.” 
15 Raffaello Pantucci, Clare Ellis, and Lorien Chaplais, Lone-Actor Terrorism Literature Review 
(London: RUSI, 2016), 12, https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201512_clat_literature_review_0.pdf/. 
16 The 2015 San Bernardino shooting and 2013 Boston bombing, for example, had two perpetrators at 
each event. To some researchers, this does not meet the definition of lone-actor terrorism. 
17 Source: Worth, “Lone Wolf Attacks.”   
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Even if we agree that lone-terrorist attacks are increasing and becoming more 
deadly, the numbers are still relatively very small; in this light, lone-actor terrorism, 
while tragic, is “ultimately insignificant” and far from an existential threat to the United 
States.18 When considering right-wing, left-wing, and religious terrorism combined, there 
have been fewer than three deadly attacks per year since 2010.19 Between September 11, 
2001, and January 1, 2017, fewer than 160 people have died as a result of lone-actor 
terrorism in the United States. Most researchers agree that, thankfully, lone-actor 
terrorism is not as lethal as attacks perpetrated by terrorist groups.20 Regardless of the 
overall impact of lone-actor terrorism to our national security, however, the American 
public will likely continue to view domestic terrorism as a threat that must be 
addressed.21 
B. THE CHALLENGE OF LONE-ACTOR TERRORISM 
Detecting and preventing terrorism has not always been the explicit goal of law 
enforcement agencies. Prior to 9/11, much of our law enforcement efforts focused on 
responding to terrorism events. With the horrific attacks on 9/11, our efforts shifted away 
from response; preventing terrorism is now the number-one priority of the FBI and the 
Department of Justice.22 Initial prevention efforts met with some success, but 
counterterrorism experts suggest lone terrorism is a tactical adaptation of terrorist groups 
and, as such, is very difficult to stop.23 Prevention and detection methods likely yield 
diminishing returns as the terrorists adapt and change to successful law enforcement 
techniques.  
                                                 
18 Barnes, “One-Man Wolf Pack,” 1655. 
19 Peter Bergen et al., “Terrorism in America after 9/11,” New America Foundation, accessed 
February 9, 2016, http://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/. 
20 Barnes, “One-Man Wolf Pack,” 1655. 
21 Ibid., 1658. 
22 Ibid., 1632. 
23 Ibid., 1649. 
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Detection of a lone-actor terrorist is extremely difficult because, as most 
researchers agree, “it is impossible to profile a lone-actor terrorist.”24 One commonality 
does exist between lone terrorists: The attackers display higher rates of mental illness 
than group-actor terrorists and the general population.25 A study by Gruenewald, 
Chermak, and Freilich found that 40 percent of lone terrorists experienced mental illness, 
compared to 7.6 percent among group-based actors.26 This is consistent with the findings 
of Horgan et al.’s study of 71 lone-actor terrorists, in which he found 39 percent had a 
previous history of mental illness.27 The number of lone-actor terrorists suffering from 
untreated mental illness may be even higher. By comparison, approximately 50 percent of 
non-ideological active shooters suffered from mental health issues.28 In this regard, lone-
actor terrorism is more similar to other forms of grievance-fueled violence, such as mass 
murders, than to networked terrorism.29 
Perhaps even more challenging than detecting lone actors is preventing lone-actor 
terrorism. As Barnes notes, successful prevention of domestic terrorism usually involves 
confidential informants, surveillance of suspected terrorists, monitoring of 
communications, and increased physical security for vulnerable locations. The solitary 
nature of the lone attacker, however, leaves little opportunity for counterterrorism experts 
to disrupt a lone terrorist attack before it happens. Barnes concludes that traditional “law 
enforcement tools simply [are] not effective against lone wolf terrorists.”30   
                                                 
24 Pantucci, Ellis, and Chaplais, Lone-Actor Terrorism Literature Review, 5. 
25 Mental illness includes psychological disturbances such as depression, post-traumatic stress 
disorder, bi-polar disorder, and inability to establish social relationships. Lydia Alfaro-Gonzalez et al., 
Report: Lone Wolf Terrorism, Georgetown University, June 27, 2015, 27, 
http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/NCITF-Final-Paper.pdf.  
26 Jeff Greunewald, Steven Chermak and Joshua D. Freilich, “Distinguishing ‘Loner’ Attacks from 
Other Domestic Extremist Violence: A Comparison of Far-Right Homicide Incident and Offender 
Characteristics,” Criminology and Public Policy 12, no. 1, (2013): 78. 
27 Horgan et al., “Across the Universe,” 23. 
28 Joel Capellan, “Lone Wolf Terrorist or Deranged Shooter? A Study of Ideological Active Shooter 
Events in the United States, 1970–2014,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 38 (2015): 402, doi: 10.1080/ 
1057610x.   
29 Worth, “Lone Wolf Attacks.”   
30 Barnes, “One-Man Wolf Pack,” 1650. 
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Barnes further points out that, even if a potential terrorist is detected, it is difficult 
for current counterterrorism efforts to prevent and disrupt lone-actor terrorism.31 
According to Barnes, efforts to deter lone terrorism through detection, threats of arrest, 
incapacitation, or incarceration likely do little to stop a determined lone terrorist. The 
culmination of such attacks, often resulting in the killing of the perpetrator, negates 
threats of prosecution in deterring lone terrorism. Even if detected, Barnes concludes, 
“the absence of pre-attack illegal conduct renders most discoveries insufficient to 
effectively incapacitate a would-be lone wolf.”32 
From a policymaker perspective, the response to lone-actor terrorism is complex. 
No two cases of terrorism in the United States are alike; the response to lone terrorism 
must, therefore, also be complex. Denying the means to carry out domestic terrorism is 
challenging. First Amendment issues aside, restricting access to specialized knowledge 
such as weapons training, bomb-making skills, and operational techniques is difficult 
given the dispersed nature of the internet. Likewise, denying access to weapons or 
explosive precursors would also run into constitutional and practical issues.   
Much of the recent counterterrorism efforts focus on community outreach as a 
means to identify individuals who may be radicalized and prevent future radicalization. 
These efforts, however, depend on public trust, which is often undermined by the use of 
confidential informants and sting operations. Given the isolated and complex motivations 
of lone-actor terrorists, it is difficult to assess how effective counter-radicalization efforts 
would be.33 As journalist Katie Worth wrote, “Lone wolf attackers are rarely motivated 
by politics alone—personal grievances are usually central to their drive.”34 A better 
understanding of the complexities motivating the individuals who commit these attacks 
may yield new approaches for preventing and disrupting lone terrorism. 
  
                                                 
31 Ibid., 1651. 
32 Ibid., 1655. 
33 Ibid., 1653. 
34 Worth, “Lone Wolf Attacks.” 
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C. THESIS GOAL: CLARIFYING THE ROLE OF MOTIVATION IN LONE-
ACTOR TERRORISM 
Researchers increasingly focus on similarities between lone-actor terrorism and 
other forms of grievance-fueled violence. McCauley, Moskalenko, and Van Son, for 
example, found similarities between assassins, school attackers, and lone-actor terrorists. 
All three types of assailants plan violence, act alone, and have a perceived grievance 
motivating their action. The researchers concluded that lone terrorists, assassins, and 
school attackers may all be subsets of a larger category of lone-actor, grievance-fueled 
violence.35   
Capellan, in his comparison of non-ideological and ideological active shooters, 
also discovered similarities. He concluded the underlying social and psychological 
factors that drive a person to violence are similar, but the manifestation of the violence 
differs greatly.36 Capellan suggests “ideological and non-ideological active shooters will 
have significant differences across all three stages of the active shooter event: 
preparation, execution, and conclusion.”37 Capellan found ideologically motivated lone-
actors are significantly more likely to have thoroughly planned the attack, to include 
research and training, making the attacks more lethal. Additionally, lone-actor terrorists 
are “significantly more likely [to] discuss their plans with others.”38 Capellan’s study 
found both ideological and non-ideological lone actors target locations they can easily 
enter and that most of the attacks end within one hour. Lone-actor terrorists, however, are 
more likely to target locations with which they have no professional or personal contact. 
Also, a lone-actor terrorist attack is more likely to end with the terrorist being killed by 
police or potential victims.39   
                                                 
35 Clark McCauley, Sophia Moskalenko, and Benjamin Van Son, “Characteristics of Lone-Wolf 
Violent Offenders: A Comparison of Assassins and School Attackers,” Perspectives on Terrorism 7, no. 1 
(2013): 6. 
36 Capellan, “Terrorist or Deranged Shooter,” 398. 
37 Ibid., 399. 
38 Ibid., 402. 
39 Ibid., 405. 
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Current efforts to analyze lone terrorism are hampered by limited empirical data. 
Recent research by John Horgan et al. attempted to rectify that limitation by comparing 
terrorists and criminals whose violence is similar, yet with different apparent motivations. 
In particular, researchers postulate comparing lone terrorists and solo mass murder 
offenders may have significant implications for investigative practices; such efforts may 
lead to a better understanding of the role motivation plays in lone-actor terrorism.40 Yet 
little research exists to further divide ideological lone actors. The ideological impact on 
the planning, execution, and conclusion of violence perpetrated by lone actors may have 
further implications for detection, prevention, and mitigation of terrorist attacks within 
the United States. Ultimately, further clarity on the similarities and differences between 
perpetrators of lone-actor violence will be beneficial to attempts to counter domestic 
terrorism. 
The primary question this research seeks to address is: How can we prevent lone-
actor terrorism? To answer this question, the research examines in depth the key 
characteristic that separates lone-actor terrorism from other forms of grievance-fueled 
violence: motivation. The thesis research utilizes a qualitative analysis of two recent 
successful lone-terrorism attacks that illustrate the two extremes of lone-actor terrorist 
motivation—individuals who are largely ideologically driven and those who are largely 
personally motivated. The cases illustrate the complexity of lone-actor terrorism but also 
provide opportunities for comparisons to other forms of grievance-fueled violence. The 
results of the case study research are compared to current grievance-fueled violence 
research to ascertain possible efficiencies to counterterrorism efforts.    
  
                                                 
40 Horgan et al., “Across the Universe,” 10. 
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D. THESIS OUTLINE AND UPCOMING CHAPTERS 
Chapter II contains a review of pertinent literature and sets the foundation for 
future chapters. The literature review focuses on our current understanding of lone 
terrorism and lone-actor grievance-fueled violence. The chapter includes definitions of 
the problem set and current challenges to understanding lone-actor terrorism. Chapter III 
discusses the research design and methodology used in the case study approach. Chapter 
IV discusses the observations and possible policy implications of the findings, as well as 
areas for future research. 
  
 12 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 13 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
What is lone-actor terrorism? This question has no simple answer, but is central to 
any meaningful discussion of this phenomenon. This literature review surveys a brief 
history of lone-actor terrorism in the United States to contextually examine why it is 
difficult to define lone-actor terrorism, and to highlight some of the challenges of lone-
actor terrorism research. The chapter then exams a topology by the National Security 
Critical Issues Task Force (NSCITF) that helps explain why violent individuals choose to 
operate alone. Equipped with such a framework, the thesis considers some possible 
explanations, and limitations, for how lone-actors radicalize. The final section reviews 
some promising research comparing lone-actor terrorism to other forms of lone-actor 
grievance-fueled violence. 
A. HISTORY OF LONE-ACTOR TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES  
Lone-actor terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Its existence can be traced back to 
nineteenth-century anarchism, which encouraged individuals to act alone or in small 
groups without direction from a hierarchical organization.41 Spaaij, a sociologist and 
researcher on the topic, points out the historical significance of lone-actor terrorism—
under the principle of leaderless resistance—to the white supremacists and 
antigovernment extremists in the second half of the twentieth century. Leaderless 
resistance advocated “an individual, or very small, highly cohesive group, engage in acts 
of anti-state violence independent of any movement, leader, or network of support.”42 
White supremacist Louis Beam popularized modern leaderless resistance as an adaptation 
to the successful destruction of hierarchical U.S. militias by law enforcement agencies.43 
More recently, Barnes, in a legal note written for the Boston Law Review, described 
                                                 
41 Ramón Spaaij, “The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment,” Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 33, no. 9 (August 2010): 859, doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2010.501426. 
42 Jeffrey Kaplan, “Leaderless Resistance,” Terrorism and Political Violence 9, no. 3 (September 
1997): 80, doi:10.1080/09546559708427417. 
43 Spaaij, “Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism,” 859. 
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jihadist-inspired lone-actor terrorism as a similar tactical evolution.44 Like Beam and 
other white supremacists, radical organizations belonging to the global jihadist movement 
encourage “smaller-scale, less technically complex tactics … [which are] more difficult 
for law enforcement and intelligence operatives in the United States to identify in 
advance.”45   
Viewing lone-actor terrorism as a tactical adaptation indicates the success of U.S. 
law enforcement agencies’ counterterrorism efforts.46 Some manifestations of lone-actor 
terrorism, however, occur without the existence of any organized terrorism network. 
Often, lone-actor terrorists have a unique blend of religious, political, and personal 
grievances not representative of a larger terrorism network. Theodore Kaczynski (also 
known as “the Unabomber”) is an example of a lone-actor terrorist who combined 
personal vendettas with political grievances.47 Many recent examples of this type of lone-
actor terrorist exist: Jared Loughner (used as a case study in this thesis) killed six people 
in January 2011 in a bizarre political statement, and Joseph Stack flew a plane into an 
IRS office in Austin, Texas in 2010.48 
A study by Hamm and Spaaij of pre-9/11 and post-9/11 radicalization found lone-
actor terrorists are becoming increasingly independent of terrorist networks.49 The 
researchers found only 42 percent of post-9/11 lone-actor terrorists hold beliefs in 
accordance with clearly defined organizational entities, as opposed to 63 percent prior to 
9/11. Hamm and Spaaij assert the increasing ideological autonomy of lone-actor terrorists 
is due to technology. The internet has supplanted the need for clearly defined 
                                                 
44 Barnes, “One-Man Wolf Pack,” 1655. 
45 Brian Fishman and Andrew Lebovich, “Countering Domestic Radicalization: Lessons for 
Intelligence Collection and Community Outreach,” New America Foundation 22 (2011), as quoted in 
Barnes, “One-Man Wolf Pack,” 1649. 
46 Barnes, “One-Man Wolf Pack,” 1615. 
47 Spaaij, “Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism,” 861. 
48 Garance Franke-Ruta, “Remember When Andrew Joseph Stack Flew a Plane into a Texas IRS 
Building?” Atlantic, May 15, 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/05/remember-when-
andrew-joseph-stack-flew-a-plane-into-a-texas-irs-building/275887/. 
49 Mark Hamm and Ramon Spaaij, “Lone Wolf Terrorism in America: Using Knowledge of 
Radicalization pathways to Forge Prevention Strategies,” U.S. Department of Justice, February 2015, 11, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248691.pdf.   
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organizational alignment. With the help of the internet, an individual can find any 
ideological cause, or create his or her own.50 Virtual networks of social media platforms 
connect people who are “worried about everything from drone strikes to a one-world 
government and the pending imposition of martial law in the United States and tell them 
that they do not worry in isolation.”51 
B. NO STANDARD DEFINITION OF LONE-ACTOR TERRORISM 
Lone-actor terrorism may not be new, but little agreement exists on what, exactly, 
lone-actor terrorism is. Spaaij and Hamm noted that a lack of consensus about lone-actor 
terminology adds to the difficulty of meaningful research on this topic.52 Other 
researchers, such as Pantucci et al., believe the lack of definitional consensus makes it 
increasingly difficult to identify key characteristics for further research.53 Various 
academic discourse has used a wide array of terms to describe a lone-actor terrorist, 
including “loner, lone actor, solo actor, solo terrorist, solitary, freelancer, self-starter, lone 
offender, lone avenger, leaderless, self-directed, self-motivated, lone wolf pack, one-man 
wolf pack, self-activating, idiosyncratic.”54 This thesis utilizes Hamm and Spaaij’s 
widely accepted definition of lone-actor terrorism as “political violence perpetrated by 
individuals who act alone; who do not belong to an organized terrorist group or network; 
who act without the direct influence of a leader or hierarchy; and whose tactics and 
methods are conceived and directed by the individuals without any direct outside 
command or direction.”55   
The lack of definitional consensus exists largely because researchers disagree on 
the elements that define a lone-actor terrorist. Some argue that two individuals can be 
seen as a collective lone actor if they do not identify with a larger terrorist network, as 
                                                 
50 Hamm and Spaaij, “Lone Wolf Terrorism in America,” 11. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ramón Spaaij and Mark S. Hamm, “Key Issues and Research Agendas in Lone Wolf Terrorism,” 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 3 (March  2015): 168, doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2014.986979. 
53 Pantucci, Ellis, and Chaplais, Lone-Actor Terrorism Literature Review, 4. 
54 Spaaij and Hamm, “Key Issues and Research Agendas,” 169. 
55 Hamm and Spaaj refer to lone-actor terrorism as lone wolf terrorism; the terms are often used 
interchangeably. Hamm and Spaaij, “Lone Wolf Terrorism in America,” 3.  
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one individual likely recruited the other to assist with the planned attack.56 The 
sociodemographic factors and behaviors driving the lone terrorists are insignificant 
between one or two individuals operating independent of a group. By expanding the 
definition of lone terrorism to include two attackers, acts perpetrated by the Tsarnaev 
brothers—responsible for the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings—and the husband and 
wife 2015 San Bernardino shooters, for example, would be included within the research.  
An additional challenge illustrated by Hamm and Spaaij’s definition arises when 
considering “tactics and methods are conceived and directed by the individuals without 
any direct outside command or direction.”57 With the online publication and 
dissemination of terrorist propaganda such as Al Qaida’s Inspire magazine and, more 
recently, the Islamic State’s Dabiq, it becomes challenging to determine the extent to 
which a lone-actor terrorist conceives of his own tactics and methods. Likewise, narrow 
definitions may also exclude copycat lone terrorists who determined tactics and methods 
based on media reports of previous attacks.   
A standard definition is certainly critical for research and policy. The conceptual 
issues introduced by the multitude of definitions prevent methodical analysis and 
solutions. Researchers, thankfully, do agree on a few consistent elements of lone-actor 
terrorists. “Most definitions refer to a lack of direction from a wider terrorist group; an 
absence of clear command and control separates lone wolves from networked terrorist 
plots.”58  
C. THE PROBLEM OF MINIMAL DATASETS 
The confusing analytical findings resulting from different definitions of lone-actor 
terrorism are magnified due to the small dataset of these rare events. The infrequent 
nature of lone-actor terrorism makes it difficult to study in rigorous detail. Becker, for 
example, considered eighty-four lone-actor terrorist attacks between 1940 and 2012 for 
                                                 
56 Paul Gill, John Horgan, and Paige Deckert, “Bombing Alone: Tracing the Motivations and 
Antecedent Behaviors of Lone-Actor Terrorists,” Journal of Forensic Sciences 59, no. 2 (March 2014): 
426, doi: 10.1111/1556-4029.12312. 
57 Hamm and Spaaij, “Lone Wolf Terrorism in America,” 3.   
58 Pantucci, Ellis, and Chaplais, Lone-Actor Terrorism Literature Review, 4. 
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his study on target selection.59 Becker’s dataset included attempted and perpetrated lone-
actor terrorist attacks. Within the timeframe included in this study, there was, on average, 
just over one case of lone-actor terrorism per year.60 Spaaij expanded his dataset for the 
period between 1968 and 2007 to include seventy-four cases of lone-actor terrorism in 
fifteen countries, with thirty occurring in the United States.61 However, neither study 
considered the temporal nature of lone-actor terrorism throughout the decades. Limiting 
research to shorter timeframes would lead to even less empirical data from which to draw 
conclusions, but keeping the timeframe broad may obfuscate emerging trends. To address 
this, Hamm and Spaaij published an additional study in 2015 that included eighty-three 
cases of lone-actor terrorism in the United States, broken down from 1940 to 2000 
(thirty-eight attacks) and 2001 through 2013 (forty-five attacks).62 
Expanding the dataset, as both the Becker and Spaaij studies do, to include 
individuals accused and charged with terrorism has additional methodological problems. 
After the shift to preventative counterterrorism, the Department of Justice focused on 
discovering, arresting, and prosecuting prospective terrorists, which has led to an increase 
of successful terrorism prosecutions. Some studies suggest that at least 62 percent of all 
successful terrorism prosecutions relied on confidential informants and sting 
operations.63 Within the Becker study, twelve out of eighty-four attacks, relied on 
confidential informants.64 In certain cases, the informants exert influence on the attack to 
include preparation, method, target, and possibly even the motivation of the attacker. As 
such, consideration must be given, as Spaaij and Hamm do, to separate controlled 
operational cases from lone terrorism not influenced by law enforcement. Because of the 
success of controlled operations, the use of confidential informants will likely remain a 
                                                 
59 Michael Becker, “Explaining Lone Wolf Target Selection in the United States,” Studies in Conflict 
and Terrorism 37, no. 11 (August 2014): 960, doi: 10.1080/0157610x.2014.952261. 
60 While this is true on average, some periods, such as the 1970s, saw a higher density of terrorism, to 
include lone-actor terrorism.   
61 Spaaij, “Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism,” 858.  
62 Hamm and Spaaij, “Lone Wolf Terrorism in America,” 4. 
63 Barnes, “One-Man Wolf Pack,” 1636.  
64 Spaaij and Hamm, “Key Issues and Research Agendas,” 171.   
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staple of domestic counterterrorism efforts; ensuring an untampered dataset will continue 
to be a challenge.65   
D. WHY INDIVIDUALS OPERATE ALONE 
Researchers with the National Security Critical Studies Task Force (NSCITF) 
developed a typology in an effort to understand why terrorists operate alone (see 
Figure 3).66 The topology is based on two key characteristics separating lone-actor 
terrorists from group-oriented terrorists: ideological autonomy and social competence. 
Ideological autonomy, representing the x axis of the topology, is the degree to which the 
lone-actor “assumes the ideology of an existing organization.”67 The researchers define 
social competence as “all the factors within an individual that influence relationship 
quality and are necessary for recruiting and maintaining supportive close personal 
relationships.”68 This characteristic is largely based on lone-actor terrorists’ higher rate 
of mental illness and social alienation compared to the general population and group-
actor terrorists.69   
                                                 
65 Barnes, “One-Man Wolf Pack,” 1637. 
66 Alfaro-Gonzalez et al., Report: Lone Wolf Terrorism, 29. 
67 Ibid., 28. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ramón Spaaij, Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations and Prevention 
(New York: Springer, 2012).   
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Figure 3.  A Topology of Lone Terrorists70 
The exact role of social competence and social isolation within an individual’s 
pathway to violence is difficult to determine. The NSCITF report agrees that lone actors 
“may choose to operate alone to improve their operational security and avoid detection,” 
but individuals may also have no choice but to operate alone because they lack social 
skills.71 This social inadequacy may indicate the maladjustment or mental illnesses that 
occur in high rates among lone-actor terrorists.72 According to the NSCITF report, 
mental illness may work in two ways: when individuals suffer from mental illness it 
increases “the likelihood of extremist ideologies resonating” and, simultaneously, 
“lead[s] to either failed and rejected attempts to join a group, or a tendency to avoid 
social interaction all together.”73 Generally, the psychopathologies suffered by lone-actor 
terrorists do not significantly reduce the perpetrator’s ability to carry out an attack.74 The 
                                                 
70 Source: Alfaro-Gonzalez et al., Report: Lone Wolf Terrorism, 29.  
71 Ibid., 28. 
72 Horgan et al., “Across the Universe,” 23. 
73 Alfaro-Gonzalez et al., Report: Lone Wolf Terrorism, 20. 
74 Ibid., 23. 
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Task Force report did conclude that social inadequacy is necessary to explain lone-actor 
terrorists.75 
In many cases of lone-actor violence, it is difficult to judge the degree of 
ideological autonomy. Most lone-actor terrorists tend to mix ideology with personal 
grievances.76 Hamm and Spaaij found 80 percent of lone terrorists held both personal and 
political grievances. The two researchers believe this is a signature difference compared 
to group terrorists, who share a collective grievance.77 Ideological autonomy usually 
correlates to a lone-actor’s grievances and the degree of ideological autonomy may 
impact the execution of a violent act. Individuals with greater independence from 
established terrorist groups are generally more likely to “rely on firearms, target multiple 
victims and engage in suicide missions.”78   
Further explaining the Task Force topology for lone-actor behavior, individuals 
with high social competence and low ideological autonomy (lone soldiers) may choose to 
operate alone for strategic purposes such as operational security.79 Lone soldiers are 
examples of tactical adaptations of existing terrorist networks mentioned earlier in this 
chapter. Individuals with high social competence and high ideological autonomy (lone 
vanguards) chose to act alone to advance an individual ideology not represented by an 
organized terrorist network.80 Individuals with low social competence and high 
ideological autonomy (loners) believe in a unique individual ideology but also may lack 
the social skills necessary to attract others to their cause.81 Likewise, individuals with 
low social competence and low ideological autonomy (lone followers) lack the social 
skills to gain acceptance into a group.82 Low social competence, especially in the loner 
and lone follower categories, highlights the role of mental health in lone-actor terrorism.   
                                                 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid.   
77 Hamm and Spaaij, “Lone Wolf Terrorism in America,” 8.  
78 Capellan, “Terrorist or Deranged Shooter,” 398. 
79 Alfaro-Gonzalez et al., Report: Lone Wolf Terrorism, 29. 
80 Ibid., 30. 
81 Ibid., 31. 
82 Ibid. 
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E. LONE-ACTOR RADICALIZATION 
Terrorism is commonly seen as a collective activity. Many researchers focus on 
collective identity and group dynamics to explain pathways to terrorism.83 Absent the 
collective or group influence, how can we explain radicalization of lone-actor terrorists? 
Hamm and Spaaij point out that virtually all lone actors demonstrate a sympathy or 
affinity with “some person, community, or group, be it online or in the real world.”84 
Most lone terrorists do not self-radicalize without some sort of group dynamic, indicating 
the process may be very similar to that of group-based terrorists. While this may be true 
for individuals who share an organizational ideology, it may not hold true for individuals 
with unique, and highly personal, ideologies. 
Horgan, in his analysis of radicalization and violence, explains there is no single 
pathway to violence. The motivators to embrace an ideology may be completely different 
from those that drive an individual to violence.85 In the case of lone-actor terrorism, 
however, the proclivity for violence may already be part of the individual’s psyche and a 
triggering event may serve as the impetus for violent action.86 The radical ideology 
simply disinhibits an individual to commit violent acts and may provide a justification for 
the violence. An individual prone to violence may not be any more or less attracted to a 
radical ideology than a non-violent person. When a violent person is also a believer, 
however, it does indicate possible future violence in the name of the radical views. 
Ultimately, it is difficult to study lone-actor radicalization because it is impossible 
to build a single profile of a lone-actor terrorist. That being said, certain demographic 
factors do appear more prevalent than others. Researchers Gill, Horgan, and Deckert 
studied the motivations of 119 individuals who perpetrated, or considered perpetrating, 
lone-actor terrorism. They found that the majority were male (96.6 percent), over the age 
of 30 (70 percent), unemployed (40.2 percent), had criminal convictions (41.2 percent), 
                                                 
83 Spaaij, “Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism,” 855. 
84 Hamm and Spaaij, “Lone Wolf Terrorism in America,” 11. 
85 John Horgan, “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on 
Radicalization into Terrorism,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
618, no. 1 (July 1, 2008): 85, doi: 10.1177/0002716208317539.   
86 Alfaro-Gonzalez et al., Report: Lone Wolf Terrorism, 21. 
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and had a history of mental illness (31.9 percent), and that others were aware of the 
perpetrators’ commitment to violent acts (63.9 percent). Ultimately, the researchers 
concluded there are no single set of behaviors that are necessary for lone-actor terrorism 
and the events emerge from a gradual series of behaviors.87 Hamm and Spaaij, in their 
2015 study, provided some recently emerging general trends in lone-actor terrorism. 
Post-9/11 lone terrorists expanded weapon selection to include “not only firearms and 
bombs but also airplanes, biological weapons, knives and construction equipment.”88 
Most post-9/11 lone terrorists have only committed one attack as opposed to the multiple 
attacks from one perpetrator witnessed before 9/11.89 The most significant change in 
post-9/11 lone-actor terrorism may be “the targeting of uniformed police and military 
officers”; the number of law enforcement personnel killed in the first thirteen years 
following 9/11 was twice that of the sixty preceding years.90 The trends are helpful in 
understanding lone-actor terrorism but the numbers do little to further our understanding 
of its underpinnings.   
F. TERRORISM AS A SUBSET OF GRIEVANCE-FUELED VIOLENCE 
Recent research compares lone-actor terrorism to other categories of lone-actor 
grievance-fueled violence such as school shootings, mass murders, workplace violence, 
and lone assassin attacks. The comparisons show promise; the many similarities among 
all forms of lone-actor violence increases the dataset of otherwise thankfully rare events.   
McCauley, Moskalenko, and Van Son were some of the first modern researchers 
to compare two seemingly disparate forms of lone-actor violence assailants: school 
attackers and assassins.91 The researchers compared existing data of forty-one school 
attackers from 1972–2000 to eighty-three assassins from 1949–1999. Both school 
attackers (78 percent) and assassins (44 percent) had a high rate of psychopathology, to 
include depression, despair, or suicidal ideations. School attackers and assassins also 
                                                 
87 Gill, Horgan, and Deckert, “Bombing Alone,” 434. 
88 Hamm and Spaaij, “Lone Wolf Terrorism in America,” 4. 
89 Ibid., 5. 
90 Ibid. 
91 McCauley, Moskalenko, and Van Son, “Characteristics of Lone-Wolf Violent Offenders.” 
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shared high levels of grievances (81 percent and 67 percent), personal crises that might 
make a person receptive to violent thought or action (98 percent for school attackers and 
around 50 percent for assassins), history of weapon use outside the military (71 percent 
and 63 percent), as well as a history of interest in violence (59 percent and 44 percent).92 
Current lone-actor terrorist research indicates similar levels of mental health issues, 
grievances, and personal crises, supporting the hypothesis that lone-actor terrorism, in 
many ways, is similar to other types of grievance-fueled violence.93   
In 2013, Lankford compared suicide terrorists to other types of rampage, school, 
and workplace shooters. He found very little difference in the underlying social and 
psychological processes, but the attackers did use different execution methods, indicating 
ideological influence on how the violence is carried out.94 Capellan furthered lone-actor 
violence research by studying 40 ideological and 242 non-ideological active shooter 
cases between 1970 and June 2014. Of the total, more than half of the cases (160) took 
place in the last ten years. Both types of shooters “tend to be white males in their '30s, 
with rather dysfunctional adult lives. They tend to be single/divorced, unemployed, have 
low levels of education, and suffer from mental illness.”95 As Capellan states, the 
similarities indicate lone-actor terrorists and deranged shooters “are but part of a larger 
phenomenon of lone-actor grievance-fueled violence.”96   
Horgan et al. compared 71 lone-actor terrorists and 115 solo mass murderers from 
1990–2013. The researchers noted both offender types are very similar in terms of 
demographics and behavior but do differ in certain elements.97 The researchers 
postulated identifying differing characteristics that might be useful for developing 
offender-specific intervention policies, targeted treatment policies, and risk assessments, 
and might “help with our understanding of who takes part in particular violent 
                                                 
92 Ibid., 14. 
93 Horgan et al., “Across the Universe,” 5–6.  
94 Adam Lankford, “A Comparative Analysis of Suicide Terrorists and Rampage, Workplace, and 
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95 Capellan, “Terrorist or Deranged Shooter,” 407. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Horgan et al., “Across the Universe,” 11. 
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offenses.”98 Key differences included lone terrorists are more likely to attempt to recruit 
others, more likely to interact virtually with members of a larger network, and more 
likely to produce public statements and letters prior to the attack. The researchers also 
found “lone-actor terrorists were significantly more likely to have university experience, 
military experience, combat experience, criminal convictions, experience a tipping point 
in their pathway to violent extremism, change address prior to their attack, live alone, be 
socially isolated, engage in dry runs, demonstrate that their anger is escalating and 
possess a stockpile of weapons.”99 Also noteworthy, lone terrorists were “significantly 
more likely to verbalize intent to commit violence to friends/family/wider audience, have 
others aware of their grievance, express a desire to hurt others, have others involved in 
procuring weaponry and have others aware of their attack planning.”100 
Horgan et al. also attempted to identify emerging trends by dividing and 
analyzing their data within two time periods, 1990–2005 and 2006–2013. The two groups 
were split based on the dramatic increase in attacks per year starting in 2006; 1990–2005 
averaged 5 per year and 2006–2013 averaged 12.75 per year.101 The researchers 
identified very few behaviors that might be responsible for the uptick of solo violence in 
the later period. They did note that more recent offenders are less likely to have military 
experience, more likely to have been imprisoned, less likely to verbalize intent, more 
likely to target indiscriminately, and more likely to use the internet in their attack 
planning.102   
  
                                                 
98 Ibid., 11. 
99 Ibid., 18. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid., 48. 
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G. CONCLUSION 
Lone-actor terrorism is a complex issue that does not lend itself to easy solutions. 
Added to the fact that no standard profile exists for a lone-actor terrorist, the complex 
physiological dynamics make understanding lone-actor terrorism especially difficult.103 
Research is hindered by definitional issues and small datasets that have contributed to 
methodological differences, which make comparisons of existing research problematic. 
However, useful topologies do exist to explain the various types of lone-actor terrorists.  
Much of the existing research surrounding lone-actor terrorist behavior draws 
upon organizational-based terrorism research. Recent efforts have taken a different 
approach and begun to examine the commonalities between lone-actor terrorism and 
other types of lone-actor grievance-fueled violence. Along this line of research, this thesis 
will seek to isolate the defining characteristic that separates lone-actor terrorism from 
other forms of lone-actor violence to consider how such a distinction can further guide 
our understanding of lone terrorism and the impact on possible prevention methods. 
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III. ANALYTICAL DIMENSION OF LONE-ACTOR VIOLENCE 
Many people view lone-actor terrorism as simply an adaptation of networked 
terrorism. Some terrorist organizations, most notably white supremacist and jihadist 
groups, encourage leaderless resistance through propaganda efforts when effective law 
enforcement prevents homegrown terrorism. This tactical adaptation is designed to 
exploit perceived vulnerabilities in our counterterrorism efforts.104 The adaptation has 
been effective; from 2006 to 2014, the United States had the highest number of lone-actor 
attacks (forty-two), followed by the United Kingdom (twenty).105   
To understand lone-actor terrorism as a tactical evolution, we need look no further 
than the counterterrorism tools in use to disrupt terrorist plots after 9/11. Immediately 
following the 9/11 attacks, the attitude toward domestic terrorism changed from response 
to prevention at any cost. As a result, government officials demanded disruption of 
terrorist plots as early as possible.106 The new emphasis on prevention led to new tools 
and powers for federal and state law enforcement in the war on terrorism. These new 
powers included the use of confidential informants to gather information and prevent 
terrorist plots, the use of community engagement to preempt radicalization, denial of 
means to specialized knowledge or potential weapons, physical security to deter would-
be attackers, and a variety of new prosecutorial authorities to ensure a strong message 
was sent to individuals contemplating violence.107   
Many of these tools are not effective against lone-actor terrorism. Lone-actors are 
much more difficult to detect, often avoiding unnecessary contact or discussion to further 
operational security. Many lone terrorists use whatever weapon is available and attack 
soft targets. Likewise, prosecutorial tools mean little to a lone-actor terrorist, especially 
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one who is willing to die for a cause. This leaves our law enforcement at a distinct 
disadvantage.108   
Equally concerning, Hamm and Spaaij propose that lone-actor terrorists are 
becoming increasingly independent from holding beliefs in accordance with a clearly 
defined terrorist network.109 Terrorist networks will continue to have less central control 
and lone terrorists could attack in creative ways not explicitly sanctioned by any 
organization. This high ideological autonomy provides further justification for 
researching lone-actor terrorism independent of organizational terrorism.   
Lone-actor terrorism as a tactical adaptation of terrorist networks cannot explain 
all manifestations of this violence. A second category of lone-actor terrorists may be 
considered individuals that are unable to operate with a group. The loner and lone 
follower, using the topology developed by NSCITF, have no choice but to operate alone 
and would do so even in a more permissible environment.110 The final category of lone-
actor terrorists, lone vanguards, may have ideological beliefs that do not readily align 
with any existing extremist organization. Their decision to operate alone (or in small 
groups if they have the social competence to convince others to join their cause) is again 
due to a lack of alternatives. Howe we understand these different types of lone-actor 
terrorists has implications for policy and prevention. 
A. DIMENSIONS OF LONE-ACTOR TERRORISM 
This thesis asked the question: How can we prevent lone-actor terrorism? 
Understanding how motivation drives a lone-actor’s violence is one way to determine 
effective prevention policies. This thesis builds off the 2012 work of Borum, Fein, and 
Vossekuil, in which the researchers proposed a dimensional approach to studying lone-
actor terrorism (shown in Figure 4). By examining the features of terrorism cases, instead 
of the categories, they proposed a continuum to help researchers and policymakers 
understand lone-actor terrorism. Within this continuum, the researchers identified three 
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distinct characteristics of importance: loneness, direction, and motivation. Loneness is 
“the extent to which the offender/attacker initiated, planned, prepared for and executed 
the attack without assistance from any other person.”111 The researchers argue that the 
degree of loneness can affect an offender’s pre-attack activities and planning efforts. 
Direction is “the nature and extent of the attacker’s independence and autonomy in all 
decisions across the spectrum of attack.”112 The researchers believe the level of 
autonomy directly influences where and how the attack will occur. The third dimension, 
motivation, is what drives a person to attack. 
 
Figure 4.  Dimensions of Lone Offender Terrorism113 
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The framework developed in this thesis isolates and focuses on only one of the 
three dimensions: motivation. Borum, Fein, and Vossekuil point out motivation is, 
arguably, what separates “lone offender terrorism from the much wider span of mass 
murders, spree killings, and assassinations.”114 By isolating motivation, one can consider 
lone-actor terrorism in relation to other forms of grievance-fueled violence.   
The intent of this thesis is not to dismiss the importance of loneness and direction. 
These two elements are essential to understanding lone-actor terrorism in relation to 
networked terrorism. However, the focus of this thesis is to understand the separation of 
lone-actor terrorism from other forms of violence. Horgan et al., in their study of 115 
mass murderers and 71 lone-actor terrorists from 1990 to 2013, also recognized 
motivation as the “fundamental distinction between the two groups.”115 In many cases, 
much of the violence of lone terrorists and mass murderers appears indistinguishable. 
Recognizing and focusing on the dimension of motivation provides conceptual clarity 
and an alternative framework for policymakers to consider the challenge of preventing 
lone-actor terrorism.   
This thesis uses a case study methodology to inductively build on the framework 
of motivation. On one end of the spectrum is the case of Abdulhakim Mujahid 
Muhammad, an offender for whom “the attack is motivated solely by a political, social, 
or ideologically based grievance, with neither revenge nor any other personal motive 
being a significant factor.”116 The other end of the motivation spectrum is represented by 
the case of Jared Lee Loughner, an individual who may be motivated, solely or in large 
part, by “revenge or some other personal motive.”117 Such a study represents the 
divergent motivation of lone-actor terrorism, as shown in Figure 5. The cases are 
necessarily imperfect and merely meant to serve as a framework to consider the 
motivational distinctions of lone-actor terrorists and help homeland security professionals 
understand the public and mental health implications of the lone actor. Additionally, it is 
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a method researchers and policymakers can use to better understand the relationship 
between lone-actor terrorism and other forms of grievance-fueled violence such as mass 
murder. 
 
Figure 5.  Motivation Dimension of Lone-Actor Terrorism 
As illustrated in Figure 5, motivation is the defining characteristic that separates 
lone-actor terrorism from other forms of grievance-fueled violence. The separation 
between lone-actor terrorism and grievance-fueled violence, represented by the dashed 
line, is highly subjective. A case that is closer to the other end of the spectrum 
(ideologically motivated), however, does not necessarily imply proximity to networked or 
homegrown terrorism. Terrorist groups continue to influence individuals to commit 
violence along any point of the spectrum. The true motivations of the perpetrator are 
irrelevant to many groups that espouse violent rhetoric or take credit for lone-actor 
attacks. Many lone offenders who “engage in terrorism or mass murder are not driven 
primarily by deep ideological beliefs.”118 Likewise, individuals can have deep 
ideologically beliefs and yet not have the social competence or share a collective 
ideology that would bring them any closer to terrorism networks.  
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The two case studies were selected to serve as archetypes for the two extremes of 
the dimension. The cases were studied in the conceptual framework of situational crime 
prevention and routine activity theory to better illuminate the motivations of successful 
lone-actor terrorist events. In keeping with the framework outlined by Horgan et al., the 
case studies were broken into four stages: (a) decision and search activity, (b) preparation 
stage, (c) event execution stage, and (d) post-event activity.119 To the extent possible, the 
influences of motivational factors in each of the phases were emphasized. The decision 
and search activity phase focuses on when the individual may have moved from radical 
thought to a willingness to take violent action by examining the possible influences of an 
individual’s decision to conduct an attack. The preparation stage focuses on possible 
motivations and how they might address the “operational, logistical, and organizational 
issues” of the attack.120 The event execution stage reviews motivational factors 
concerning how the attack was perpetrated, such as timing, public statements, and 
modifications to the attack. The final stage, post-event activity, considers how the 
terrorist intended to end the attack.121 As Horgan et al. state, studying motivation in each 
of the phases may help explain the true motivations of the perpetrator and “it may be 
possible to formulate phase-specific intervention strategies that seek to deter and disrupt 
future lone-actor terrorist plots.”122 
In addition to Horgan et al.’s framework, this thesis considers the possibility that 
some current lone terrorism may be better understood in the context of grievance-fueled 
violence. What moves an individual to become a lone terrorist may share similar 
underpinnings with individuals who are moved to become active shooters, mass 
murderers, or even perpetrators of workplace violence. By expanding and considering the 
available dataset to include other examples of lone-actor violence, researchers may be 
able to better understand some of the unique aspects of lone-actor terrorism, which may 
ultimately lead to improved prevention. 
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B. LIMITATIONS 
Ascertaining motivation is “possibly the most difficult of the three dimensions to 
discern.”123 As Spaaij notes, “Assigning purposes and motivations to individual acts of 
terror is inherently subjective and open to interpretation.”124 Lone-actor terrorists usually 
act “from a complex mix of personal and principled ideas tangled in web of emotions and 
beliefs.”125 As such, it can be difficult to assign clear-cut motives for lone-actor terrorist 
acts. Ultimately, however, such an effort could be worthwhile to better discern the 
complexities surrounding lone-actor terrorism. 
Borum, Fein, and Vossekuil point out two specific challenges that make 
motivational analysis difficult. First, the offender’s stated motivation may not correspond 
to his or her actual motivation.126 Second, the higher rate of mental illness among lone 
offenders, as compared to networked terrorists, may also make attribution more 
complicated. “Mental Illness is not necessarily a ‘master motivation,’ nor does it 
automatically suggest a greater or lesser hazard.”127 It does, however, make it harder to 
determine what role, if any, mental illness may have contributed to the violence. By 
focusing on Horgan’s four stages, this thesis attempts to ascertain explicit motivation but 
also inferred motivation, based on indicators such as target selection, event execution, 
and other indicators of personal or ideological grievances.   
The data used for this research are publicly available and largely based on two 
case studies compiled by the National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC). The U.S. 
Secret Service established the NTAC in 1998 to conduct research and provide guidance 
on the threat assessment process. The advantage of using NTAC reporting is access to 
Secret Service data that would not otherwise be available to the general public. 
Additionally, a qualitative approach based on the two case studies may overcome the 
difficulty in ascertaining the attacker’s motivation by considering motivational indicators 
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in addition to verbalized grievances. Finally, the focus on two successful post-9/11 lone-
actor attacks removes much of the bias inherent in the controversial sting operations the 
FBI relies on to catch potential lone-actor terrorists.   
C. CASE STUDIES 
1. Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad 
On June 1, 2009, Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, formerly Carlos Leon 
Bledsoe, shot and killed U.S. Army Private William Long and wounded U.S. Army 
Private Quinton Ezeagwula outside of the Army-Navy Recruiting Center in Little Rock, 
Arkansas.128 The case of Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad provides an example of a 
lone-actor terrorist greatly motivated by an ideologically based grievance.   
a. Decision and Search Activity 
Muhammad was raised by a middle-class Baptist family in Memphis, Tennessee. 
Throughout his school years he had various behavioral problems and multiple contacts 
with law enforcement. While in high school, Muhammad was allegedly a member of a 
gang and had experienced a number of suspensions due to fighting.129 In the summer of 
2003, after graduation from high school, Muhammad was involved in a traffic accident in 
which he threatened to kill the driver of the other vehicle.130 On February 21, 2004, 
during Muhammad’s freshman year in college, law enforcement discovered drugs, a 
loaded SKS rifle, two shotguns, and a switchblade knife in the car Muhammad was riding 
in. Muhammad claimed ownership of the weapons and faced a lengthy prison sentence 
but the charges were dismissed and expunged in June 2004.131   
The 2004 arrest may have spurred Muhammad to turn his life around. In 
December 2004 he converted to Islam and stopped drinking and smoking marijuana. 
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Over the next year, Muhammad displayed several signs of his commitment to Islam. 
During a 2005 visit to his parents’ home, he took down all his posters of Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr., explaining to his parents that Islam did not allow glorification of idols 
other than Allah. Muhammad stopped playing basketball and listening to rap music, and 
set his dog loose because of the Muslim belief that dogs are unclean. Muhammad also 
became argumentative with his brother-in-law when discussing religion and 
unsuccessfully attempted to convert family members to Islam.132   
In September 2007 Muhammad moved from Nashville, Tennessee to Aden, 
Yemen, ostensibly to teach English at the British Academy. Muhammad’s sister was 
concerned that he might get involved in radical activities but Muhammad dismissed the 
idea, claiming he was not a violent person. Muhammad’s letters to his sister became 
increasingly religious and he continued to attempt to convert her to Islam. It appears 
Muhammad’s interest in violent extremism was nurtured by the contacts he made in 
Yemen. He continued to be angered by news reports about the treatment of Muslims by 
U.S. soldiers. On November 14, 2008, officials arrested Muhammad for using a fake 
passport while attempting to travel to Somalia. Muhammad had manuals in his 
possession on how to construct explosives and homemade silencers as well as videos of 
militants. An FBI agent travelled from the Nashville Field Office to Yemen to interview 
Muhammad. Approximately two weeks after his arrest in Yemen, Muhammad’s parents 
contacted their congressional representative, which eventually led to Muhammad’s return 
Muhammad to the United States on January 29, 2009. Muhammad eventually settled in 
Little Rock, Arkansas, to oversee a branch of his father’s business.133 
b. Preparation Stage 
Muhammad likely initiated his plan for a violent attack against a U.S. target 
shortly after his resettlement in Little Rock. Because of his limited budget and his refusal 
to use credit in adherence to Islam’s prohibition, it took Muhammad some time to 
purchase guns and stockpile ammunition. In early May 2009, Muhammad purchased a 
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.22 rifle with a laser sight from a retail store. He would later claim the purchase was a test 
to see if he was under surveillance.134 A week later, he purchased a semiautomatic 
handgun through a personal posting in a newspaper. He also purchased a Russian-made 
semiautomatic rifle secondhand from another individual. Muhammad was concerned the 
FBI was monitoring his activity and believed buying used weapons would decrease his 
chance of detection.135   
Around the same time he acquired the weapons, Muhammad began to plan the 
details of his attack by conducting target identification research online. He settled on a 
plan to assassinate Jewish targets and attack military recruiting centers in the Southeast, 
mid-Atlantic, and Northeast areas of the United States. On May 28, 2009, Muhammad 
posted a video discussing his plans to attack Jewish and military targets in retaliation for 
Americans’ actions against Muslims.136 The night before Muhammad began attacks, 
which culminated in the killing of U.S. Army Private Long, he watched jihadist videos 
online.137 
c. Event Execution Stage 
On the night of May 29, 2009, Muhammad began a three-day rampage engaging 
in six failed attempts to attack Jewish and military targets. Muhammad approached the 
home of a rabbi in Little Rock and fired ten shots from the .22 rifle before driving away. 
He then drove 135 miles to Memphis, Tennessee, and approached the home of a second 
rabbi around 3:00 a.m. Muhammad left without attacking because he was worried about 
being reported by the neighbors. On May 31, 2009, Muhammad drove to Nashville where 
he left the home of a third rabbi without incident. He then drove to a Jewish community 
center and left without attacking due the presence of children and the location not 
affording an easy getaway. Muhammad then drove 260 miles to Florence, Kentucky, to 
discover the military recruiting center he had targeted was closed. Muhammad then drove 
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215 miles back to Nashville to throw a Molotov cocktail at the home of his sixth target at 
around 2:00 a.m. The explosive bounced off the window without causing any damage.138 
After these failed attempts, Muhammad felt discouraged and decided to drive the 
350 miles back to Little Rock. Approximately three miles from his apartment, 
Muhammad saw Private Long and Private Ezeagwula wearing U.S. Army fatigues and 
smoking outside the Army-Navy Career Center. At 10:19 a.m. on June 1, 2009, 
Muhammad drove up and fired fifteen shots at the two soldiers, killing Private Long and 
seriously injuring Private Ezeagwula.139 
d. Post-event Activity 
Muhammad attempted to flee the scene but was pulled over approximately twelve 
minutes after the attack. Among weapons discovered in Muhammad’s truck, arresting 
officers also found medicine and a plastic tub containing non-perishable food, water, and 
a butane lighter. On July 25, 2011, Muhammad pleaded guilty to, among other offenses, 
capital murder resulting in twelve life sentences without parole.140 As justification for his 
actions, Muhammad later stated, “There’s an all out war against Islam and Muslims in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Waziristan, Chechnya, Somalia, Palestine, Philippines, Yemen 
etc. And Muslims have to fight back.”141 
Muhammad’s violence has continued in prison. On one occasion he stabbed a 
prison guard and, on another, stabbed a fellow inmate. He is responsible for a number of 
threats against his guards and has vandalized his cell on numerous occasions.142  
e. Summary 
The case of Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad demonstrates the motivation of a 
violent ideology. Muhammad appears to clearly represent lone-actor terrorism as a 
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tactical adaptation of networked terrorism. Muhammad’s violent radicalization likely 
occurred while he was travelling to Yemen, and largely drove his target selection. Like 
other lone-actor terrorists, Muhammad was a convert to Islam. He also displayed violent 
tendencies prior to the attack and was familiar with the weapon which likely guided the 
attack execution. Horgan et al. identify several key traits of lone-actor terrorists that 
Muhammad exhibited. Muhammad made a public statement prior to the attack (an action 
shared with 60 percent of lone terrorists), had previous criminal convictions 
(57.5 percent), and lived alone (44 percent).143 Illustrating the difficulty of profiling lone-
actor terrorists, however, Muhammad did not show any signs of mental illness and 
appeared to have a loving, supportive family and a stable job managing his father’s Little 
Rock tour bus company branch.     
2. Jared Lee Loughner 
On January 8, 2011, Jared Lee Loughner shot and injured U.S. Representative 
Gabrielle Giffords in Tucson, Arizona. Loughner killed six people in the attack and 
injured twelve others.144 In the years prior to the attack, Loughner exhibited symptoms of 
mental illness. His motivation for the attack appeared to be a combination of conspiracy 
concerns (driven by his illness coupled with a personal dislike for the target), concerns 
about his inability to find long-term employment or stay enrolled in school, and a search 
for meaning in his life.    
Loughner’s case demonstrates the critical role of subjectivity in labeling an event 
as terrorism or some other form of grievance-fueled violence such as mass murder. 
Researchers such as Hamm and Spaaij list Loughner as a lone-actor terrorist but the 
START Global Terrorism Database, along with most U.S. federal agencies, do not 
categorize Loughner’s attack as terrorism.145 Certainly it meets the definition for this 
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thesis of “political violence perpetrated by individuals who act alone.” The inability to 
adhere to a standard method of classification highlights a major discrepancy in which 
some individuals, especially those with mental health issues, are labeled lone-actor 
terrorists and others with similar complex motivations are labeled mass murderers.    
a. Decision and Search Activity 
Loughner had an early history of drug abuse, which may have contributed to his 
dropping out of high school in Tucson at the end of his junior year. in the summer of 
2006.146 In addition, he had a tendency to become overly augmentative with those who 
disagreed with him and frequently spoke about his dislike of the government and its 
cover-up of an unspecified conspiracy. After leaving high school, Loughner enrolled in a 
program through Aztec Middle College to earn his diploma and transition to Pima 
Community College. Around this time, Loughner allegedly begun taking hallucinogenic 
drugs and had difficulty holding down a steady job.147 
In 2007 Loughner attended a political event hosted by U.S. Representative 
Giffords in Tucson. Loughner posed bizarre questions to Giffords and was unhappy with 
the resulting interaction. Loughner came to dislike her, referring to Giffords as “fake” 
and “unintelligent” to his friends.148   
In 2008 Loughner started to display indicators of mental illness.149 He reportedly 
began to hear voices and started to drift away from his close friends from middle and 
high school. Throughout 2009 and 2010, Loughner displayed bizarre and concerning 
behavior while taking classes at Pima Community College, resulting in his suspension 
from the school in October 2010. Much of his behavior centered on his anger toward 
government and authority, believing his numerous confrontations with school 
administrators were part of a larger conspiracy. Loughner’s parents were concerned about 
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the effects of illicit drugs on their son’s behavior and asked him to undergo a drug test; 
the results came back negative.150   
Approximately thirty days after his suspension in November 2010, Loughner 
bought a handgun from a retail store.151 He continued to exhibit concerning behavior and 
made those around him feel uncomfortable. During this same time he also appeared 
desperate to be around people. Loughner called his few remaining friends frequently, 
showed up at their homes uninvited, and often offered to pick up the tab when Loughner 
and his friends went out as a way to spend more time with them.152   
Loughner’s online behavior was equally concerning. His online postings escalated 
as he vented about his inability to obtain and maintain employment. On January 13, 2010, 
in an apparent cry for help, Loughner posted that he was contemplating suicide 
“again.”153 A plea for companionship also appeared on December 13, 2010, when 
Loughner posted a question as to why no one was talking to him.154   
b. Preparation Stage 
Loughner appears to have made the decision to assassinate U.S. Representative 
Giffords sometime in December 2010. During this time, his social media site had 
concerning posts and videos including references to violence against Giffords and threats 
toward law enforcement.155 In late December 2010, Loughner was reportedly practicing 
with his handgun. In early January 2011, Lougner conducted online research about 
political assassins and punishments for assassinating a public figure. On January 7, 2011, 
one day before the attack, Loughner likely conducted surveillance of the target site by 
visiting a retail store next to the location where a political event featuring Giffords was 
slated to occur the following morning.156  
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c. Event Execution Stage 
On the morning of January 8, 2011, Loughner wrote a final message on his social 
media site in which he stated, “Goodbye.”157 He then took a taxi to the location of 
Giffords’s public event. Loughner approached a member of Giffords staff and confirmed 
the identity of the congresswoman. At 10:12 a.m. Loughner walked to the front of the 
line where Giffords was meeting constituents and shot her. He then began firing at the 
crowd, killing six people and injuring twelve others. Bystanders subdued Loughner when 
his weapon malfunctioned.158   
d. Post-event Activity 
After the arrest, investigators executed a search warrant of Loughner’s home. In 
Loughner’s bedroom they found a small safe containing an envelope on which was 
written words or phrases such as, “I planned ahead,” “My assassination,” and “Giffords.” 
Additional content within the safe implied that, in addition to Loughner’s dislike for 
Representative Giffords, he may have been motivated by a desire to achieve fame as an 
assassin.159 Based on his behavior, it is likely that Loughner did not plan on surviving the 
attack.  
Initially, Loughner was deemed incompetent to stand trial due to mental health 
issues. Loughner was forcibly medicated and restored to competency, at which time he 
pleaded guilty to all charges and was sentenced to seven life sentences plus 140 years in 
prison.160 
e. Summary 
Loughner’s case highlights several of the challenges in researching lone-actor 
terrorism on this end of the motivation continuum. Incidents of terrorism with a complex 
mix of personal and ideologically grievances, especially coupled with mental health 
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issues, are much more difficult to categorize than cases such as Muhammad’s. 
Loughner’s diminished social competency likely contributed to his acting alone. Hamm 
and Spaaij refer to this as “relative deprivation.” Loughner’s social exclusion may have 
led to feelings of being deprived from employment, education, or even a meaningful 
social identity. Loughner’s quest for notoriety as an assassin may have been “a deviant 
adaptation to this gap between means and goals.”161 Taking this one step further, 
Loughner’s inability to build social bonds may have been a major motivation for 
conducting the attack as a way to gain notoriety. 
Lone offenders, compared to networked terrorists, “appear … more commonly to 
have psychological problems.”162 Borum points out, in research of 119 lone-actor 
terrorists, nearly one-third had a history of mental health problems.163 According to 
Horgan et al., signs of mental illness were observed in 39 percent of lone-actor terrorists 
and 48 percent of mass murderers.164 Contrary to popular belief, and illustrated in this 
case, some people who suffer from mental health issues can plan and execute behavior 
just as well as those without mental health issues.165 Mental health issues illustrate the 
complexities of motivational analysis and threat assessments when considering that 
“mental illness, by itself, does not necessarily change the level of threat.”166 
Unlike in the Muhammad case study, the role of other communities, either virtual 
or physical, is unclear in Loughner’s radicalization. Hamm and Spaaij proposed that lone-
actor radicalization begins with “personal and political grievances which form a basis for 
an affinity with online sympathizers.”167 The researchers note that the affinity with an 
extremist group is becoming less important, with only four in ten post-9/11 lone-actor 
terrorists showing an affinity with extremist groups, as opposed to six in ten of the pre-
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9/11 lone terrorists. Hamm and Spaaij theorize virtual communities may have replaced 
some of the extremist groups but they contend that “virtually all lone wolves demonstrate 
affinity with some person, community, or group, be it online or in the real world.”168 
Loughner’s bizarre belief in a government conspiracy did not lend itself to an affinity 
with any radical groups; although he did seem to share his beliefs more freely to his 
online community than to others, the role the community played in Loughner’s 
radicalization to violence remains unknown. 
A comparison of the two case studies (shown in Table 1) illustrates Loughner’s 
attack has much more in common with mass murder attacks than Muhammad’s. 
Loughner felt personally offended by Representative Giffords, as is the case with most 
mass murderers. According to Horgan et al., “Most mass murderers (57 percent) are 
concerned with personal feelings of having been wronged by a specific person and 
ultimately murder (or attempt to murder) the person whom they hold responsible for that 
wrong.”169 Also, like Loughner, most mass murderers do not “concern themselves with 
post-event activity.”170 Forty-three percent of mass murder events end when the offender 
commits suicide and 10 percent of mass murderers are killed by the police at the scene, 
with only 17 percent planning an escape.171 It is also worth noting that, possibly like 
Loughner, most mass murderers do not need virtual or physical sympathizers to 
radicalize to violence. Instead, mass murderers experience an “ideation” stage, in which 
“the individual realizes and accepts that violence is the appropriate and necessary means 
to address the grievance.”172 
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IV. FINDINGS, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
Get on the damn elevator! Fly on the damn plane! Calculate the odds of 
being harmed by a terrorist! It’s still about as likely as being swept out to 
sea by a tidal wave. . . . Suck it up, for crying out loud. You’re almost 
certainly going to be okay. And in the unlikely event you’re not, do you 
really want to spend your last days cowering behind plastic sheets and 
duct tape? That’s not a life worth living, is it? 
—John McCain173 
 
A. CONCEPTUALIZING LONE-ACTOR TERRORISM 
As noted in Chapter II, this thesis adhered to Hamm and Spaaij’s definition of 
lone-actor terrorism as “political violence perpetrated by individuals who act alone; who 
do not belong to an organized terrorist group or network; who act without the direct 
influence of a leader or hierarchy; and whose tactics and methods are conceived and 
directed by the individuals without any direct outside command or direction.”174 A 
standard definition is certainly critical for research and policy. The conceptual issues 
introduced by the multitude of definitions prevent methodical analysis and solutions. The 
confusing analytical findings resulting from different definitions of lone-actor terrorism 
are magnified due to the small dataset of these thankfully rare events.   
No standard definition, however, of lone-actor terrorism will likely provide an 
objective distinction to separate some lone-actor terrorists from other perpetrators of 
grievance-fueled violence. This is evident in the case of Jared Loughner. Regardless of 
what definition is used, the subjectivity of terms such as “political violence” leaves room 
for interpretation. Definitions that allow for objective distinction of motivation would 
have little value. The costs of putting qualifiers within the definition such as “no 
indicators of personal grievance” would likely render the definition overly restrictive and 
would still not guarantee that personal grievances played no motivating role. Ultimately, 
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the thin line between personal and ideological violence makes such distinctions largely 
irrelevant. Any definition of lone-actor terrorism will require subjectivity in the 
individual’s motives. The lack of an objective distinction between lone-actor terrorism 
and other forms of grievance-fueled violence likely has broader implications for 
researchers looking to further understand current and future manifestations of lone 
terrorism than it does for counterterrorism and law enforcement officials focusing on 
preventing violence. 
Clearly, in some cases, only a subjective distinction exists between mass 
murderers and lone-actor terrorists. Motivation is arguably the key difference between the 
two. The motivation can have a critical role in the way the violence manifests itself, 
including in areas such as preparation, target selection, and post-attack behavior. Yet 
mass murder attacks and lone-actor terrorism are usually motivated by a complex mix of 
political, personal, emotional, and social factors that carry a person down a path that ends 
in violence.175 The complicated interactions of these drivers limit the practicality of 
motivational distinctions and we may continue to see more overlap between the two types 
of violence. Distinguishing between ideologically motivated lone-actor violence and 
personal grievance–motivated violence is in large part futile; the two are increasingly 
intertwined.  
Analysis of the two case studies identified five observations that can contribute to 
the overall clarity of lone-actor terrorism: 
 
Obvervation #1 Distinction between lone-actor terrorists and mass 
murderers is, in some cases, arbitrary. 
Obvervation #2 Existing counterterrorism prevention tools are not 
optimized for lone-actor terrorism. 
Obvervation #3 Mental illness plays a complex role in all forms of 
grievance-fueled violence. 
Obvervation #4 Unlike other forms of grievance-fueled violence, networks 
can reinforce lone-actor terrorism. 
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Obvervation #5 Would-be offenders often come into contact with 
community systems, but threat management is inadequate 
without follow-up attack deterrence activities. 
 
1. Observation #1: Motivational Complexity of Lone-Actor Terrorists 
The case studies illustrate the difficulty in making clear and meaningful 
distinctions between motivational factors of lone-actor terrorism and other forms of 
grievance-fueled violence.176 This was reflected in the difficulty of finding representative 
cases that illustrate purely ideologically or purely personal motivations. The studied cases 
have elements of personal and ideological grievances interwoven with emotion and 
behavioral traits that led to the justification for violence. Hamm and Spaaij’s study of 
ninety-eight lone-actor terrorists between 1940 and 2013 validated the commonality of 
personal and ideological grievances. They discovered evidence of both themes in 80 
percent of all lone-actor terrorists and consider the commonality a signature of lone-actor 
terrorism.177 The lack of meaningful distinctions for the vast majority of lone-actor 
terrorists does have some important implications. 
Borum, Fein, and Vossekuil’s dimensional study of lone-actor terrorism 
considered the characteristics of loneness, direction, and motivation.178 The two 
dimensions of loneness and direction may not have a significant influence on motivation. 
Generally, we would assume lone-actor terrorists that have direct assistance from one or 
two co-conspirators, or some sort of group guidance, would also have deeper ideological 
motivations for terrorism. Many lone-actor terrorists, however, do not hold deep 
ideological beliefs.179 Given the interwoven grievances of lone-actor attackers, strong 
ideological adherence may not be as prevalent as one would assume. Conversely, 
individuals with no co-conspirators or group guidance may be highly ideologically 
motivated based on an internalized interpretation of a group ideology. The lack of 
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meaningful motivational distinctions may exist independent of the loneness and direction 
dimensions. 
2. Observation # 2: Limitations to Existing Counterterrorism Tools 
While a case study method is anecdotal in nature, it may be illustrative to mention 
a few observations about lone-actor terrorism supported by other research initiatives. To 
help illustrate the findings from the case studies, this section revisits lone-actor terrorism 
as an adaptation to the counterterrorism tools currently used to prevent terrorism 
mentioned in the literature review and in research design. As Barnes outlined in his 2013 
paper concerning law enforcement and prosecutorial responses to lone-actor terrorism, 
the federal and state tools include community engagement to preempt radicalization, the 
use of confidential informants to gather information and prevent terrorist plots, denial of 
means to specialized knowledge or potential weapons, physical security to deter would-
be attackers, and a variety of new prosecutorial authorities to ensure a strong message is 
sent to individuals contemplating violence.180 Let us consider each one in regards to 
lone-actor terrorism. 
a. Community Engagement 
Community engagement as a means to preempt terrorism appears to be effective. 
For example, Mueller found in his study of 120 arrests of Muslim-Americans for 
terrorism related offenses, 48 of the arrests (in which the initial source of information was 
disclosed) were initiated from the Muslim-American community.181 This approach seems 
to be supported by the high amount of leakage of intent found in Horgan et al.’s study 
(80 percent for lone terrorists and 46 percent for mass murderers) as well as Hamm and 
Spaaij’s study (84 percent of pre-9/11 and 76 percent of post-9/11 lone-actor 
terrorists).182  
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Another potential observation for grievance-fueled violence is the presence of 
stressors in the attackers’ lives. Horgan et al. found that 62 percent of lone terrorists and 
43 percent of mass murderers experienced a “tipping point” or stressful event prior to the 
attack.183 According to the findings, 27 percent of lone actors and 63 percent of mass 
murderers experienced long-term stress.184 A Secret Service study examining attacks on 
federal government targets found that over 90 percent of offenders experienced a stressful 
event prior to carrying out their attack. Furthermore, 75 percent had experienced at least 
one stressor in the year prior to the attack.185 The stressors ranged from minor losses to 
major negative changes such as conflicts in relationships, financial hardships, work or 
school-related problems, or legal issues.  
The significant occurrence of both leakage and stressors demonstrates the 
importance of continued, and possibly improving, community engagement. As illustrated 
by the number of successful lone-actor attacks, however, the results of such engagement 
may be limited. The reduction of leakage, or broadcasting, intent from pre-9/11 to post-
9/11 lone-actor terrorists may show an adaptation away from observable pre-event 
behavior within the community. For example, “jihadist groups have warned aspiring 
terrorists to avoid discussing their plans with others.”186 Hamm and Spaaij identified that 
post-9/11 lone-actor terrorists are becoming increasingly independent from physical 
communities and migrating toward virtual ones.187 This trend may reduce the 
effectiveness of community outreach as lone actors rely on a scattered network far 
removed from their physical location.   
The findings also have an impact on counter-radicalization strategies. While 
moderate messaging efforts are worthwhile as a means to counter group narratives, many 
lone offenders who engage in terrorism “are not driven primarily by deep ideological 
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beliefs.”188 Counter-radicalization efforts will probably do little to curb many of the lone-
actor terrorist attacks. An individual who has radicalized on his or her own, especially 
when considering individuals such as the Unabomber (Theodore Kaczynski) or Jared 
Loughner, is likely not receptive to moderate narratives that do not address the unique 
combination of personal and ideological grievances.189 The inability to make clear 
motivational distinctions of lone-actor terrorism implies that counter-radicalization 
efforts will have a limited impact on individuals who are personally driven as well as 
more ideologically motivated. 
b. Confidential Informants 
The use of confidential informants is extremely controversial. The United States 
is one of the few Western countries that allows the use of confidential informants in 
terrorism prevention activities. One study of terrorism-related prosecutions since 2009 
found that 50 percent of the studied cases involved informants.190 The use of confidential 
informants seems to be well suited for lone-actor terrorism; Horgan et al. found that 
24 percent of lone terrorists tried to recruit others, as compared to only 2.5 percent of 
mass murderers.191 Interestingly, and controversially, confidential informants may be 
able to influence lone actors who are otherwise unable to form social connections, and 
who may not have been receptive to other intervention efforts.192   
As with all prevention measures, it is impossible to know how many cases 
involving intervening informants would have resulted in violence. However, in many 
cases, the confidential informants “seem to have acted as [a] ‘psychological accelerant’ 
for would-be terrorists.”193 It remains to be seen, however, if the confidential informants, 
playing the role of like-minded acquaintances or mentors, could also be used to counter 
the radicalization of the individual instead of accelerating the process. Furthermore, when 
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used exclusively against one minority group, such as Muslim-Americans, it is likely the 
use of confidential informants comes at a cost of undercutting the effectiveness of 
community involvement. Ultimately, due to the notoriety of using confidential 
informants, future plotters, as demonstrated by Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, are 
likely to increase operational security.194 For example, a confidential informant was 
introduced, and rejected, in the case of the Orlando shooter in 2013; this method was, at 
best, ineffective in preventing the Pulse Nightclub shooting and, at worst, might have 
contributed in some way to the shooter’s radicalization.195 Finally, individuals with low 
social competence may not be as detectable to confidential informants due to their 
internal social constraints. These factors will likely impose an upward limit on the 
effectiveness of confidential informants.   
c. Denial of Means 
Denying the means to conduct violent attacks usually entails denying access to 
specialized information, such as vulnerabilities of targets or how to manufacture 
weapons, and denying access to weapons.196 However, lone-actor terrorists appear to 
select weapons not based on symbolic value or lethality but on ease of acquisition and 
use. Both Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad and Jared Loughner chose weapons they 
were familiar with for their attacks: guns. While a gun or bomb may seem like a first 
choice in the United States, other lone-actor terrorists choose knives, use a vehicle to run 
people over, make a pressure cooker bomb, or use whatever object can be turned into a 
weapon. The weapon availability and selection have a direct impact on the manifestation 
of the violence: weapon first, then the target.197 This effectively negates the denial of 
weapons enacted by the federal government in response to past terrorist incidents.198 Gun 
control may reduce the lethality of the attack but will not stop a determined attacker. 
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Hamm and Spaaij, in their study of pre-9/11 and post-9/11 lone-actor terrorists, found 
that the contemporary group has indeed expanded their arsenal of weapons.199 The 
expansion could be viewed as a tactical adaptation based on the denial of means against 
bomb-making materials, guns, and specialized weapon knowledge.    
d. Physical Security 
Generally, researchers believe terrorists holding narrowly defined ideologies will 
select targets that they are less familiar with and that represent the enemy. More broadly 
defined ideologies, however, such as radical jihad, will allow for the targeting of sites the 
terrorist is familiar with and likely have a higher operational success.200 The 
decentralized nature of lone-actor terrorism, coupled with the intermingling of personal 
grievances, can often lead to a target that has personal significance to the attacker. While 
this appears to be very true for jihadist lone attacks—such as the Orlando nightclub, the 
San Bernardino attack at the Inland Region Center, or even the Ft. Hood attack—it can 
also be true for right-wing terrorists—such as David Adkisson, who targeted a church his 
ex-wife previously attended. Hamm and Spaaij found that attacks have, indeed, become 
more personal.201   
As an example of the blurred lines between ideological and personal grievance–
fueled violence, terrorists who are more ideologically motivated still target familiar 
people or places based on personal grievance factors; in the San Bernardino attack, the 
perpetrators killed coworkers who had thrown them a baby shower earlier in the year.202 
The latitude for attackers to choose their own targets may be an evolution of terrorist 
groups encouraging lone-actor behavior. Regardless, it still indicates the role of personal 
grievances throughout the spectrum and the ability of lone-actor terrorists to overcome 
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denial of means and physical security measures by selecting targets about which they 
have ample prior knowledge.   
e. Prosecutorial Authorities 
With the focus on prevention in U.S. counterterrorism efforts, “prosecutors have 
developed a variety of tools to secure convictions for pre-attack conduct of suspected 
terrorists.”203 Barnes provides examples such as criminal liability, conspiratorial liability, 
material support, and pretextual prosecutions.204 Unfortunately, the tactical adaptation of 
lone-actor terrorism illustrates the difficulty of using prosecutorial authorities as 
preventative measures. First and foremost, “the material and preparation required to 
execute the typical lone wolf attack are, absent governmental omniscience of an 
individual’s intent, wholly legal.”205 Second, lone-actors (by definition) have no co-
conspirators and are absent direct links to a foreign terrorist organization necessary for 
prosecution of “material support to terrorism.”206 Finally, criminal punishment for the 
terrorist attacks as a deterrent may have prevented some lone-actor terrorism, yet attacks 
happen frequently enough to continue to be a major concern to the public and 
policymakers. Criminal punishment is likely even less of a deterrent for individuals 
motivated by personal grievances, as illustrated by the high number of mass murderers 
who have no intention of surviving the attack. 
3. Observation #3: Role of Mental Health in Grievance-Fueled Violence 
Another shared commonality with grievance-fueled violence is the prevalence of 
mental health issues in both mass murderers and lone-actor terrorists.207 Horgan et al.’s 
study of 71 lone-actor terrorists and 115 solo mass murderers from 1990 to 2013 showed 
a history of mental illness among 39 percent of lone terrorists and 48 percent of mass 
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murderers.208 This is remarkably higher than in the general population, in which only 
about six percent is believed to suffer from severe mental illness.209 Corner and Gill 
concluded that lone actors with a history of mental illness are more likely to display 
certain behaviors that may be detectible by law enforcement and intelligence agencies.210 
Intuitively, one would assume that mental health issues would be more prominent closer 
to the personal grievance–fueled end of the motivation continuum. However, given the 
complexity of attackers’ motivations, it is possible that mental health issues occur 
throughout the degree of offender type. While the exact distribution of mental health 
issues in relation to motivation is outside the scope of this thesis, it is likely that 
understanding and addressing mental health issues would be valuable within the full 
spectrum of lone-actor terrorism as well as other forms of grievance-fueled violence.  
The role of mental illness in radicalization to violence remains unclear. Some 
mental illness may increase an individual’s affinity toward an extremist group. Likewise, 
mental illness may affect an individual’s ability to cope with perceived slights and lead to 
ideation that violence is the only alternative. Regardless of psychopathology’s role, the 
high rate of mental illness among perpetrators of lone-actor violence demonstrates, at the 
very least, a correlation. Further research into the relationship between lone-actor 
violence and mental health may be beneficial to preventing lone-actor terrorism as well 
as other types of violence. It could also change the dialogue from a counterterrorism 
focus to one of mental health assistance. Providing options such as mental healthcare 
services or specialized acute care responder teams would likely garner more community 
support than the current use of pre-event prosecution to prevent terrorism.   
4. Observation #4: Role of Networks to Reinforce Violence 
One aspect that is unique to lone-actor terrorism in relation to other forms of 
grievance-fueled violence is the ability of networks to reinforce motivations to attack. 
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This is especially true for the jihadist ideology, which praises previous attacks. While our 
law enforcement may be able to curtail the praise and hateful rhetoric of domestic 
terrorist groups, we have not been as effective against international groups such as Al 
Qaida and the Islamic State. As an example, prior to the call for attacks in the West by 
the Islamic State on September 22, 2014, there had been no attacks in the West motivated 
by the group’s violent rhetoric. In the year following the call to jihad in the West, twenty-
one plots killed fifteen people.211 Our inability to shut down the radical propaganda 
coming from these groups appears to have a detrimental effect on our efforts to mitigate 
lone-actor terrorism. Hamm and Spaaij found evidence of potential copycat attacks in 
one-third of lone-actor terrorism cases.212 Most experts agree a key motivation in mass 
shootings, to include ideologically inspired mass shootings, is the fame and power the 
individual believes he or she will achieve for the crime.213 Researchers from Western 
New Mexico University found that the “prevalence of these crimes has risen in relation to 
the mass media coverage of them and the proliferation of social media sites that tend to 
glorify the shooters and downplay the victims.”214   
5. Observation #5: Insufficient Community-Level Attack Deterrence 
The National Threat Assessment Center prepared the case studies of Abdulhakim 
Mujahid Muhammad and Jared Lee Loughner to illustrate the importance of threat 
assessments and collaboration in detecting potential perpetrators of violence. Much of the 
literature surrounding grievance-fueled violence deals with ways to improve detection. 
This leads to an understated theme in lone-actor terrorism research: detection is not 
necessarily the biggest challenge. A Secret Service study that examined attacks on federal 
government targets found that all of the perpetrators had contact with one or more 
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community systems in the year prior to the attack.215 In addition, consider the number of 
lone-actor terrorists who had contact with law enforcement and yet still managed to 
conduct an attack. The list includes both case studies used in this thesis, the Boston 
Marathon bombers, the Orlando nightclub shooter, and the Fort Hood shooter, to name a 
few.216 While an argument could certainly be made for improved information sharing 
and better threat assessments, the fact is we have very few law enforcement or 
community tools at our disposal to legally deter lone-actor terrorists, even after detection 
of a likely candidate to commit violence is identified.   
B. POSSIBLE POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR PREVENTION OF LONE-
ACTOR TERRORISM 
The observations identified from the qualitative case studies led to five possible 
policy considerations. None of the policy implications are mutually exclusive and each 
can be viewed as possible research extension for further consideration.   
1. Threat Management 
Our current lone-actor threat assessment might be improved by considering the 
confluence of personal and individualistic grievances coupled with ideological 
motivations. Threat assessments focusing on grievance-fueled violence, such as the 
Workplace Assessment of Violence Risk (WAVR-21), could certainly be useful for 
detection of would-be terrorists as well as other mass murderers. Likewise, 
conceptualizing a lone-actor terrorist’s radicalization to violence through the pathway to 
violence model typically reserved for mass murderers may yield valuable clues to future 
manifestations of lone-actor terrorism.217   
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Equally—if not more—important is considering effective threat management as 
part of the prevention strategy. Threat management addresses prevention once an 
individual is detected as a likely candidate for committing violence. One recommendation 
that has gained some traction at university campuses is the development of an integrated 
threat assessment and management team (TAM), which would “develop, implement, 
monitor, and (on an on-going basis) review a case management plan to intervene and 
mitigate the threat posed, to the extent reasonably possible.”218 Proponents of the TAM 
propose several subject-based strategies for preventing violence. Short-term intervention 
strategies include continuously engaging with the subject, mentoring, assisting the 
individual with problem-solving and coping skills, evaluating the subject’s mental health, 
and establishing behavior expectations directly with the subject.219 Short-term 
intervention strategies are coupled with ongoing efforts to move the subject away from 
violent thoughts, provide the subject with support resources, and communicate with other 
agencies to continue subject monitoring beyond the TAM community purview.220 Such 
threat management techniques may prove valuable for individuals who show a high 
probability to commit violence, to include potential lone-actor terrorists.   
2. Conceptual Approach to Prevention 
Besides directly confronting the complicated motivations of lone terrorism in the 
United States, there are other ways to minimize terrorism. Terrorism in the United States 
accounted for less than 160 deaths between post-9/11 and the end of 2016.221 Some 
researchers suggest that the chance of being the victim of terrorism in the United States is 
one in 3.5 million.222 At most, all mass killings, to include high-profile lone-terrorism 
events, account for only 1 percent of all murders in the United States annually.223 Lone-
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actor terrorism, when viewed as an adaptation to the success of our counterterrorism 
efforts, is certainly far less threatening than the large-scale, networked attacks the public 
was warned about immediately following 9/11. As Barnes points out, “Lone wolf 
terrorists—poorly trained individuals operating alone with minimal equipment against 
relatively unimportant targets—do not pose an ‘existential threat,’ or even a significant 
threat, to the United States.”224   
However, Americans do worry about terrorism. A December 2015 Gallup poll 
found that 47 percent of Americans were “‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ worried that they or a 
family member will become a victim” of a terrorist attack. This is in contrast to 38% that 
worried “about becoming a victim of mass shooting.”225 The number of mass murders, 
which include lone-actor terrorist attacks with four or more victims, is on the rise. In 
addition, the numbers of casualties from these events has been rising steadily over the 
past decade.226   
3. Fear Reduction Policies 
Policymakers have the difficult task of balancing the actual threat with the 
perceived threat. One possibility is to place more emphasis on policies designed to reduce 
the fear and anxiety associated with terrorism.227 Fear and anxiety are central to 
terrorists’ goal; taking this power away from the terrorists should be a main goal of our 
policies. Fear reduction policies might include informing the public about how rare 
terrorism in the United States really is. This would require cooperation between 
politicians, media, and public/private agencies. Such policies would likely have the added 
benefit of making the American public more resilient. Such an effort would be an uphill 
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battle given the funding, political support, and emotional connotations associated with the 
issue of terrorism. 
4. Perception Management 
Severing the ideological connection between terrorism and the violent event is a 
second way to reduce the impact of terrorism. This could be done by focusing on the 
personal grievances that motivated the individual. The public needs to understand that the 
violence was not driven simply by a hateful ideology but was the act of an individual 
with emotional and possibly mental health issues that, ultimately, was unable to function 
in our society. Taking credit away from the extremist organization not only prevents the 
terrorist group from benefiting for the event, but also sends a signal to other would-be 
lone-actors that violence do not add purpose or significance to a person and that violence 
should not be emulated.   
5. Public Health Model 
One way of achieving both the goal of limiting fear and minimizing the 
connection between violence and terrorism may lie in a public health model. As Horgan 
et al. demonstrate in their comparison of lone-actor terrorists and mass murderers, 
motivation is the only fundamental difference between the two groups.228 While both 
categories may evoke irrational fear, improving public health to address the 
underpinnings of mass murder could ultimately help not only lone-actor terrorism, but 
also other forms of grievance-fueled violence such as school shootings, assassinations, 
and workplace violence. More research into public health solutions to grievance-fueled 
violence may be time well spent in the quest for reliable prevention. Ultimately, this 
approach may be the best way to reduce lone-actor terrorism.   
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C. CONCLUSION 
It is beneficial for homeland security professionals to consider lone-actor 
terrorism from a different perspective. Motivation is the key characteristic that separates 
a mass murderer from a lone-actor terrorist.229 As Spaaij points out, however, “The 
boundaries of lone wolf terrorism are inevitably fuzzy and arbitrary.”230 Motivation is 
becoming less distinguishable and may indicate that lone-actor terrorist attacks are 
becoming more similar to mass murders in the decision and search activity stage 
(personal grievances drive target selection) and post-event stage (less concern for escape, 
more deadly). Likewise, some lone-actor terrorists may experience a radicalization 
process more in line with mass murderers (ideation) and less dependent on virtual or 
physical networks. Ultimately, the evolution of terrorism to a solo activity renders many 
of our post-9/11 prevention tools obsolete or inadequate. By shifting our focus toward the 
commonalities with other forms of grievance-fueled violence, research efforts could be 
focused on threat assessment management or mental health models that may effectively 
prevent lone-actor terrorism.   
Such is the nature of terrorism that we cannot abandon our current 
counterterrorism policies without an increased risk of network or homegrown terrorism. 
As a tactical adaptation, lone-actor terrorism cannot be deterred with the very law 
enforcement tools that forced the change. Formulating specific policies to address lone-
actor terrorism, however, is complicated given the lack of identifiable profiles within 
offender types or within motivational extremes. It may be possible to develop pre-event 
indicators by considering the distribution of proximal and distal factors in relation to 
motivation. It is possible that cases that fall on the two extremes of the motivation 
continuum have unique commonalities. This, in turn, may provide insight into the 
relationship between motivation and pre-event indicators. As an example, individuals 
who are more ideologically motivated may also be more prone to leakage or more likely 
to conduct pre-attack reconnaissance. Unfortunately, due to the isolation of lone 
terrorists, no conceivable policies are likely to prevent all lone-actor terrorism.   
                                                 
229 Ibid., 107. 
230 Spaaij, “Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism,” 857. 
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One thing is clear in our goal to prevent lone-actor terrorism: our security 
agencies must have greater collaboration with public health services and understand what 
might contribute to violence risk. In some cases, it might be possible to treat a potential 
lone-actor terrorist as a mental health issue as opposed to a criminal or security threat. 
While it will not prevent all occurrences of lone-actor terrorism, a mental health approach 
may encourage people to report on relatives they fear may be radicalizing. Also, this 
could be an alternative to heavy-handed policies that may, ultimately, be 
counterproductive. Such a policy could not only reduce lone-actor terrorism but might 
have a significant impact on other forms of grievance-fueled violence while avoiding the 
pitfalls of the massive resource allocation and civil liberty violations any impactful 
counterterrorism approach would require.   
Ultimately, perhaps the best way to prevent lone-actor terrorism is to convince 
Americans to stop worrying about terrorism.231 As politician and mental health advocate 
Patrick J. Kennedy stated, “Terrorism is a psychological warfare. Terrorists try to 
manipulate us and change our behavior by creating fear, uncertainty, and division in 
society.”232 Policies treating, perhaps even redefining, certain cases of lone-actor 
terrorism as a public health issue could help reduce the fear associated with the threat of 
lone-actor violence. As the public and policymakers continue to demand effective 
policies to prevent lone-actor terrorism, we, as a nation, will need to address the difficult 
public health problem of grievance-fueled violence. Perhaps our war on terror could give 
us the impetus to apply much-needed resources to the task. 
  
                                                 
231 Mueller, “Unusual Propositions about Terrorism,” 497. 
232 Congressman Kennedy used these words to introduce the National Resilience Development bill of 
2003 (H.R.3774, 108th Cong.) aimed at enhancing Americans psychological resilience to terrorist threats 
and attacks. The bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security in 
2004 with no further action.   
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